"Sivo, Peter " <peter.sivo(a)netapp.com> writes:
> Is this the reason that you all do this? I thought it was because
> Corp IT never had reliable NIS services and you were binding to a
> server that you knew was "blessed" and stable?
On the whole, our NIS servers are rock solid. We bind to a specific IP
address for the reasons Jay stated (namely we know not to trust NIS,
and especially NIS broadcasts as far as we can throw it/them).
> The questions, though, is that are people going to continue to hardcode in a
> server, so even if I had 5 NIS servers/slaves per network, it wouldn't make a
> difference?
There are two separate issues here:
1) The current NetApp NIS client code (especially when run with a
single server specified as we do) isn't particularly robust. If we
could specify 5 IP addresses instead of one, and the failover went
smoothly, this would help quite a bit. Plus you could specify hosts
in a different broadcast domain (perhaps on a more protected
subnet).
2) NIS will never be secure, but being able to tell a filer not to pay
attention to any one who pretends to be your NIS server (via
specifying addresses) is a good thing. Not the perfect thing, but
better than the current status quo.
Besides the scenario Jay proposed where the rogue server is
available before the real one after a power blink, you could also
probably throw enough of a denial-of-service against either the
filer or the NIS server to cause the filer to attempt a rebind. If
your filer rebinds to the rogue...
To directly answer your question, it's the sixth NIS server on your
net (that you didn't put there) that's the real bummer.
Peace,
dNb
eagerly looking forward to the new NIS code